The Vicious Cycle of Thai Agricultural Products: From Golden Age to Price Crash /By Longtunman
From the story of aromatic coconuts, which were once a hit agricultural product for farmers in Ratchaburi Province. Back then, they could be sold for as much as 40 Baht per fruit, generating a massive amount of income for coconut farming groups.
Today, however, many "Lhong" (middlemen packing houses) in Ratchaburi have announced buying prices for Thai aromatic coconuts at only 2–3 Baht per fruit.
Aromatic coconuts are not the first Thai agricultural product to face this situation. Starting about 20 years ago, another economic crop that went through a nearly identical cycle was "Rubber."
Since 2004, the government has encouraged rubber planting in various areas. At that time, there was no production planning to align with actual market demand.
Back then, Thailand was the world's largest producer and exporter of rubber. Fortunately, international demand grew significantly, causing rubber prices to trend upward every year.
As the price of rubber climbed, more and more farmers rushed to plant rubber trees.
The peak of the rubber industry occurred around 2011. This was driven by massive demand from China for raw rubber to support its booming automotive industry.
In 2011, the average price of unsmoked rubber sheets rose to 124 Baht per kilogram, reaching a peak of 171 Baht per kilogram.
With prices this high, the luckiest farmers were those who started planting in 2004.
This is because rubber trees take about 7 years to mature for tapping. Those who started in 2004 reached the harvesting stage by 2011, allowing them to sell their products at peak prices.
However, if farmers started just 4 years later, around 2008, by the time their trees matured, they would be hit by a price crisis so severe they would nearly face a total loss.
By 2015, when these later trees matured, the result of everyone rushing to plant became clear. Thailand's rubber output surged by over 25% compared to 2011.
This oversupply caused prices to crash. The average price for rubber sheets plummeted from 124 Baht per kilogram in 2011 to just 49 Baht per kilogram in 2015.
The price drop wasn't just due to the massive surplus in Thailand that couldn't be cleared fast enough; China's import demand also slowed down.
Furthermore, Thailand faced competition from neighbors like Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, which have similar climates and soil suitable for rubber.
Many rubber plantations in these neighboring countries were actually pioneered by Chinese investors. These investors chose to buy rubber from their own networks at lower prices to supply China's automotive industry.
That rubber crisis is no different from the current crisis facing Thai aromatic coconuts.
Thai aromatic coconut is a highly popular product that grew alongside the tourism and export sectors. Naturally, China is the primary export market for Thailand.
Originally, locals in Ratchaburi, Nakhon Pathom, and Samut Sakhon grew them wholesale at 5–10 Baht per fruit, without focusing much on exports.
Later, as Thai tourism flourished—especially with the influx of Chinese tourists—aromatic coconut was rebranded as a "Super Fruit" and immediately became a major export to China.
Beyond its popularity in China, it also became a staple in the ready-to-drink coconut water market found in convenience stores.
High prices and popularity led many rice farmers to switch to planting aromatic coconuts instead.
For a while, the price soared to a peak average of 40 Baht per fruit.
However, once prices got that high, the end market—particularly China—began to feel that the price per fruit from Thailand was becoming too expensive.
This caused Chinese business groups, who were once just the "buyers" at the end of the chain, to move in and "control" the supply chain from upstream to midstream to capture all the profit margins.
They started by taking over the midstream. Some Chinese agri-businesses used nominees to set up their own packing houses (Lhong) in strategic areas like Ratchaburi and Nakhon Pathom. This allowed them to handle grading, packaging, and logistics directly to warehouses in China themselves.
Then they moved upstream to monopolize the purchase of coconuts from plantations within their own Chinese networks.
At the upstream level, some Chinese businessmen used Thai nominees to own plantations. They then used their network of packing houses to squeeze the prices paid to independent Thai farmers until the farmers' income could no longer cover their costs.
Furthermore, some Chinese investors offered long-term land leases to hire farmers to grow coconuts exclusively for their network. Under these contracts, the investors cover the costs of planting and harvesting, paying the farmers a fixed wage.
Through integrated management of packing houses and network plantations, the cost of exporting coconuts to China was significantly reduced. This forced market prices down, leading to the incredibly low prices we see today.
From rubber to aromatic coconuts, what common patterns can we see in the agricultural cycle?
It starts with a product becoming a hit and prices rising. Every farmer rushes to plant it, leading to an eventual price crash because the buyers hold massive power to control the price.
For example, major buyers like large Chinese processing or distribution companies purchase Thai products in massive volumes.
Since China is the main market and Thai agricultural products rely heavily on it, China gains immense bargaining power.
Without strict law enforcement or government trade oversight, Chinese agri-business networks can expand to become wholesalers or "owners of coconut packing houses" themselves.
They eventually become producers or "plantation owners," allowing them to drive down the purchasing cost—the "price per fruit."
Ultimately, Thai farmers who are not part of these large business networks are left behind, facing price crashes and financial losses.
This reflects the pain of Thai farmers, who are producers with very little bargaining power, from rubber to aromatic coconuts.
To break this repetitive cycle in Thai agriculture, the following steps are necessary:
- Transforming agricultural output into diverse processed products: This includes branding or creating GI (Geographical Indication) products like scented candles, coconut oil, coconut wine, or cosmetics to penetrate global markets. Most importantly, products must reach multiple markets to reduce reliance on a single export destination.
- Supporting high-value processing: Similar to rubber, which now has markets in factories producing rubber gloves, saline tubes, tires, and spare parts. This helps sustain current rubber prices from dropping too low.
- Strict enforcement against unfair trade practices: This includes checking if "Lhong" owners have genuine 51% Thai shareholding or just nominees, and taking legal action against price collusion or predatory pricing that forces farmers to sell below cost.
- Strengthening agricultural cooperatives: This increases bargaining power against buyers and helps farmers purchase supplies like fertilizer or machinery at lower costs.
Ultimately, what happened to "Rubber" in the past and "Aromatic Coconuts" today is just the tip of the iceberg of deep-rooted problems in Thai agriculture.
If we continue with a trade model that "leaves our lives in the hands of foreign middlemen," future top-tier products like "Durian" or "Mangosteen" may inevitably fall into this same vicious cycle.