A New Model for Thai Trains: When the Private Sector Enters SRT Tracks /By Longtunman
Recently, the new Railway Transport Act has opened the door for private companies to apply for licenses to operate trains alongside the State Railway of Thailand (SRT). This act is set to take effect by this coming September.
Based on this latest transportation law approved by the Cabinet, in the next few years, we might see private company trains running on the tracks of the State Railway of Thailand.
The question is: What are the pros and cons of this business model?
Longtunman will explain.
It must be noted that the rail business in Thailand is currently divided into several formats:
- Urban Mass Transit: The colorful electric train lines like the BTS, MRT, and Airport Rail Link.
- Suburban Rail Systems: Such as the SRT Red Line.
- Long-Distance Rail Systems.
For the urban electric lines, we generally know that operations usually follow a concession model, where the government grants rights to private companies to manage and operate the trains.
However, for the Red Line and long-distance trains—covering the Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Northeastern lines—all of these are currently under the care of the state enterprise, the State Railway of Thailand (SRT).
The SRT is responsible for everything in the long-distance rail business, whether it is investing in track construction, purchasing train sets, or managing the operations themselves.
But because the SRT is a state enterprise under the Ministry of Transport, investments ranging from track construction to procuring train carriages require subsidies from the national budget.
Every project must pass through government agencies and the Cabinet for approval to build new routes or acquire new trains. Consequently, new rail projects depend primarily on the government of the day.
As for operational management, the SRT currently oversees and manages all train operations and stations by itself.
Therefore, the SRT collects all revenue from fares or space rentals but must also shoulder all costs, such as fuel and depreciation, on its own.
If we examine the SRT’s annual financial statements, we find that the organization suffers losses exceeding 10 billion baht every year:
2022: Revenue 22,784 million baht, Loss 15,676 million baht
2023: Revenue 21,764 million baht, Loss 14,378 million baht
2024: Revenue 28,857 million baht, Loss 21,905 million baht
2025: Revenue 28,085 million baht, Loss 20,060 million baht
If we break down the SRT's revenue, the main source is long-distance train operations for transporting passengers and goods. In 2025, the SRT's revenue from this sector stood at 6,167 million baht.
Another source is revenue from leasing SRT land, such as the site of Central Lardprao shopping mall. In 2025, land rental income amounted to 4,453 million baht.
Now, looking at the expense side, we see a stark reality: While revenue from train operations was 6,167 million baht, the operating expenses for that transport were 7,668 million baht.
In other words, the moment a train "leaves the station," it is already operating at a loss.
And these expenses do not yet include locomotive maintenance, administrative costs, or staff salaries.
Furthermore, the largest expense is depreciation and amortization of locomotives, carriages, tracks, and stations—including massive hubs like Krung Thep Aphiwat Central Terminal.
In 2025, these depreciation costs amounted to as much as 15,997 million baht.
Since the SRT is a state enterprise under the Ministry of Transport, whenever it operates at a loss, the government provides subsidies to compensate for those losses every year.
Another problem for Thai trains is the limited number of diesel locomotives and carriages. This results in a very low frequency of trips, which is insufficient to meet passenger demand.
Additionally, many carriages and locomotives are decades old.
The most recent batch of carriages and locomotives ordered by the SRT was the "CNR" sets—115 new special express carriages ordered from China. These entered service in 2016, nearly 10 years ago.
Since then, the SRT has hardly ordered any additional carriages. Moreover, following the pandemic crisis, the SRT decommissioned several express and special express carriages.
This was because the retired carriages and locomotives were in poor condition and had rising maintenance costs, making their operation no longer worth the fare revenue.
It must be admitted that many current locomotives and trains are over 20 years old and may face retirement in the next few years.
In the past, the SRT has consistently proposed and pushed for the procurement of new locomotives and carriages, but these plans have yet to receive final approval.
Several agencies have objected to these new purchases, including the National Economic and Social Development Council (NESDC), which evaluated the plans and stated they were not yet worth the investment.
The NESDC views the national budget as limited and believes it should be allocated to other transportation projects that offer greater economic benefits.
They also point out that since the SRT is still losing money, ordering more locomotives and trains would likely increase the cost burden and is not yet sufficiently cost-effective.
Therefore, the enactment of the new Railway Transport Act, which allows the private sector to invest in train operations using SRT tracks, is a significant shift.
In reality, this is seen as a way to reduce the government's budgetary burden for replacing old locomotives and carriages.
Private companies will be able to collect fares themselves, but they must also bear all costs—such as fuel, staff expenses, and depreciation—on their own.
The SRT will no longer need to shoulder these specific costs.
Furthermore, the SRT can collect "Track Access Fees" from these private companies.
This rental income is essentially "passive" revenue that the SRT can collect with almost no operational management costs.
If the new Railway Transport Act is enforced and private companies actually participate in bidding, it should lead to more carriages and train sets, increased trip frequency, and better fulfillment of passenger needs.
Moreover, it helps the SRT trend toward smaller losses because it gains rental income without the associated operational overhead.
Another benefit of the government opening tracks to private leasing is that it creates competition.
Previously, long-distance rail was a monopoly operated solely by the SRT. Now, with private competitors entering the fray, passengers will have the right to choose between different service providers.
When competition occurs, various operators will be driven to improve and develop their services to be better.
It seems that allowing the private sector to join rail operations benefits everyone: the passengers, the private rail companies, and the SRT itself.
However, under the new Act, the SRT—as the supervising authority—must act as an effective regulator.
They must oversee train scheduling to ensure it matches passenger volume on specific routes or at certain times.
They must ensure that lease contracts do not unfairly disadvantage any party.
They must ensure that private train fares remain appropriate for the public.
And they must focus on developing the areas surrounding stations and local public transport systems to encourage more people to travel by train.
Currently, several private entities have shown interest and have prior experience in rail-related businesses, such as:
- Italian-Thai Development (ITD): A construction giant with experience building the original BTS Green Lines 30 years ago.
- TPI Polene (TPIPL): A cement company with experience managing freight trains and one of Thailand's largest private entities currently leasing locomotives and wagons from the SRT.
- Eastern & Oriental Express (E&O): Highly distinguished in luxury commercial and tourism rail operations in Malaysia and Singapore.
These private companies are likely to own their own train sets and run them alongside SRT trains. In the future, it is entirely possible we will see an "Italian-Thai" train running on SRT tracks.
Ultimately, allowing the private sector onto state tracks isn't just about increasing the number of trains. It is a fundamental shift in the business model of Thai railways.
It moves the SRT from an entity that "shoulders everything" toward becoming an "infrastructure owner" that generates revenue by letting others use its assets. This could be the key to making the SRT's "ten-billion-baht loss" gradually disappear.
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The big question remains: When the same tracks are used by multiple players, will it lead "Thai Trains" to a more efficient destination, or will it just be a change of drivers while still running on the same old problems?